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Abstract 
As the climate on our planet is changing, natural disasters are occurring increasingly often, and 
Sweden is not an exception. At the same time, Facebook and other social media are more 
frequently used as crisis communication tools among public organizations. Traditionally, 
research within the field of Crisis Communication is pursued from a management perspective, 
and therefore this thesis uses a recipient perspective. With a starting point in the 2014 wildfire 
in the County of Västmanland, the greatest fire in modern Swedish history, this thesis explores 
what kind of information the public wants from a public organization on Facebook during a 
disaster, and how they prefer it to be communicated. Using qualitative interviews a conclusion 
is reached, which suggests that the public wants correct and local information to be 
communicated in a quick and personal manner, and that trust is an essential factor in how the 
crisis communication on Facebook is perceived. This thesis was written by all three authors to 
an equal extent. 
 
 
Keywords: crisis communication, social media, Facebook, disaster, wildfire, trust, public 
organization, recipient perspective, Västmanland. 
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Sammanfattning 
I takt med att klimatet förändras ser vi allt oftare naturkatastrofer äga rum, och Sverige är inte 
undantaget från denna utveckling. Samtidigt blir Facebook och andra sociala medier ett allt 
vanligare verktyg för kriskommunikation i offentliga organisationer. Traditionellt har 
forskning inom kriskommunikation ett managementperspektiv och därför undersöker denna 
kandidatuppsats istället kriskommunikation från ett mottagarperspektiv. Genom kvalitativa 
intervjuer, och med utgångspunkt i den största branden i modern svensk historia, branden i 
Västmanland sommaren 2014, undersöks vilken information och hur människor vill att denna 
kommuniceras på Facebook under en katastrof. I slutsatsen föreslås det att allmänheten vill ha 
korrekt och lokal information kommunicerad på ett snabbt och personligt vis, samt att 
förtroende spelar en viktig roll i hur man uppfattar kriskommunikation på Facebook. Arbetet 
kring detta examensarbete har till lika stora delar utförts av samtliga tre författare. 
 
 
Nyckelord: kriskommunikation, sociala medier, katastrof, brand, offentlig organisation, 
mottagarperspektiv, Västmanland. 
 
Antal tecken inklusive blanksteg: 108 856 
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1 Introduction 
The weather was hot, dry and windy when the 2014 wildfire in the County of Västmanland, 
Sweden started. It was the last day of July and the majority of Swedish office workers were on 
vacation. A spark from a mounder ignited a small forest fire. When the emergency services 
were alerted, an area of about 900 square meters was on fire, but by August 4 it was clear that 
this was something else. The fire had officially become the greatest in modern Swedish history 
(LV, 2014). On the ground hundreds of firefighters, members of the National Guard and 
volunteers fought the fire, and from the air more than twenty helicopters and airplanes water 
bombed the area. During the most dramatic day of the fire, it spread with the speed of two 
kilometers an hour, and the fire area quintupled in size. In total about 1,000 individuals and 
1,700 farm animals were evacuated. Hundreds of millions Swedish kronor worth of forest were 
lost, and several people were traumatized having to watch their lives’ work go up in flames. 
Along with the diminishing of the flames, the publicity around the fire slowly decreased, but 
for the affected individuals the process had only begun. Nine months later, on April 21 2015, 
the fire was officially extinguished1, but the memories still remain.  
 
All over the globe an increasing number of natural disasters is taking place (Noordegraaf & 
Newman, 2011). In the last two years alone, over 700 natural disasters have struck the planet 
(Carmen Leong Mei, Shan, Peter & Laddawan, 2015). We argue the wildfire in Västmanland 
is an example of this environmental change taking place even in the historically calmer corners 
of the world. In Sweden, crisis communication traditionally involve the national warning 
system Viktigt Meddelande till Allmänheten2, which is broadcast on TV and radio, and on 
extraordinary occasions as a loud outdoors signal3. When using mass media the public is often 
seen as a passive audience who accepts messages without further reflection (McQuail, 1997; 
Thompson, 2004). However, with the development of new media, this view has come to change 
(Carey, 2009) and social media has become a new channel for crisis communication (White, 
2012). This was exemplified during the 2014 wildfire in Västmanland, where the Facebook 
pages of public organizations became important sources of information for the public. This 
                                                          
1 Länsstyrelsen, 2015 http://www.lansstyrelsen.se/vastmanland/Sv/nyheter/2015/Pages/inga-glodbrander-
upptackta.aspx Retrieved 05-25-2015 
2 In English: Important Message to the Public 
3 Myndigheten för samhällsskydd och beredskap, 2009 https://www.msb.se/vma Retrieved 05-25-2015 
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altered media landscape highlights the need for two-way communication, as well as the infinite 
diversity of interpretations of messages (Carey, 2009; Falkheimer & Heide, 2014), as social 
media allow the public to share their opinions easily.  
 
This concept of two-way communication is one of the cornerstones in the field of Strategic 
Communication (Eksell & Thelander, 2014), from which our approach on crisis 
communication derives. Furthermore, the Swedish population is using social media more 
frequently (Findahl, 2014), and several crisis communication practitioners and researchers 
often express optimism of the potential of social media to enhance communication during a 
disaster (Houston et al., 2015). Therefore, with the starting point in said wildfire, we have 
chosen to investigate how Facebook could be used as a crisis communication tool by a public 
organization in times of disasters. As research from a recipient perspective on this subject is 
still relatively scarce (Jin, Liu & Austin, 2014) we chose this perspective, which led us to visit 
the affected area in Västmanland. Lastly, research on how a Swedish public organization could 
benefit from the use of this new crisis communication tool is likewise limited. Because of this, 
we argue there is a clear knowledge gap which we intend to further explore. 
 
1.1 Purpose 
Our purpose is to explore how social media could be used by a public organization to 
communicate during a disaster. In order to do so, we have chosen a recipient perspective for 
our research, because traditionally research in crisis communication is management centered. 
With this thesis we intend to contribute to the field of Strategic Communication, with further 
insight of the public’s preferences on social media content and execution during a natural 
disaster.   
 
To achieve this purpose, we formulated the following research questions and applied them to 
the 2014 wildfire in Västmanland, Sweden. 
 
1. What information did the public perceive as important on Facebook during the disaster? 
2. How did the public prefer this information to be communicated on Facebook during 
the disaster? 
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1.2 Limitations 
For this thesis, we have limited our research to how the public perceived the communication 
of public organizations on the social medium Facebook during a specific case: the large 2014 
wildfire in central Sweden. As previously mentioned (see section 1) we claim the use of crisis 
communication in social media needs further exploring, and this specific case gives us a unique 
possibility to do so. Moreover, we have chosen Facebook because it is the most visited social 
network in Sweden (Findahl, 2014), and because the Facebook pages of public organizations 
served as vital information sources during the fire (LV, 2014). 
 
In crisis communication, the critical event is normally divided into three phases; pre-event, 
event, and post-event (Coombs, 2014; Falkheimer et al., 2009). Even though all three phases 
are interesting and worthy of exploration, due to time constraint, this research focuses solely 
on the event phase. We chose this specific phase because Facebook and other social media 
facilitates the information to be shared almost instantaneously, which in the crisis phase could 
be a matter of life and death. Social media is also relevant in the other phases, but then the 
organizations often have more time to communicate. We have determined the event phase  to 
be from July 31, 2014, the day the fire started, until August 11, 2014, when the fire was declared 
to be under control by officials (LV, 2014). However, it is noteworthy that the fire was not 
completely extinguished until April 21, 20154. 
 
Finally, we are aware of the limitations placed upon this thesis, by our choice to explore a 
social medium. Firstly, not all are capable of using, or willing to use, the Internet (White, 2012) 
and therefore our thesis has a restricted demographic scope (see Appendix 1).  Secondly, social 
media is a communication tool which is in constant transformation, and a public organization 
cannot decide which social media network is going to be the most popular (White, 2012) when 
a disaster strikes. Neither could it control software changes which might be implemented on 
the platforms, because that is controlled by the company who owns it (White, 2012).   
                                                          
4 Länsstyrelsen, 2015 http://www.lansstyrelsen.se/vastmanland/Sv/nyheter/2015/Pages/inga-glodbrander-
upptackta.aspx Retrieved 2015-25-05 
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2 Previous Research 
The section presents recent studies pursued within the field of Crisis Communication. This 
research shows how crisis communication has evolved towards including several new and 
slightly different terms. We have also observed that recent research still often holds a 
management approach to crisis communication, although the recipient perspective is 
increasingly discussed. We further present studies on how social media has developed into a 
common crisis communication tool, and how it is used by recipients. Lastly, we present recent 
findings from Sweden and describe how our thesis distinguishes itself from the previously 
mentioned research.  
 
When studying previous research in the field of Crisis Communication a majority holds a 
management perspective, which focuses on private corporations and their reputations (Heath 
& O’Hair, 2009). For example, there are numerous models and theories for how to strategically 
maintain and rebuild the corporative image, such as Corporate Apologia (Ware & Linkugel, 
1973), Image Restoration Theory (Benoit, 1995) and Situational Crisis Communication Theory 
(Coombs, 2014). More recent research from this perspective also includes social media 
strategies. Researchers argue that when these models and strategies are used by organizations 
it could result in a higher reputation after the crisis (Andersson, 2014; Coombs, 2014), as well 
as fewer secondary crises, compared to a similar strategy used only in traditional media (Utz, 
Schultz & Glocka, 2013). These findings stress the importance of including social media into 
organizations’ crisis communication plans, in addition to traditional mass media. This 
conclusion seems to be shared among different researchers (e.g. Austin, Liu & Jin, 2012; 
Coombs, 2014; Utz et al., 2013). 
 
Even though research has been conducted on the role of social media in crisis communication 
during the last couple of years (e.g. Coombs & Holladay, 2014; Eriksson, 2014a; Ki & Nekmat, 
2014; Romenti, Murtarelli & Valentini, 2014), some researchers argue there is still a lack of 
studies regarding the recipient point of view (Falkheimer et al., 2009) when using social media 
in a crisis (Jin et al., 2014). However, there are now a number of articles discussing the recipient 
perspective, and many of these are using a uses and gratification approach. Although originally 
developed in the 1940’s for understanding how and why the public uses the mass media, it is 
today sometimes applied on social media (Houston et al., 2015). This approach for 
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understanding how recipients use crisis information could provide clues for what information 
they value. One example of a uses and gratification study is Steelman, McCaffrey, Velez and 
Briefel (2015) who explored what information the public used, found useful, and trusted during 
five wildfires in America. They state the public often found talking to representatives of rescue 
personnel useful, but due to the limited availability of these they did not use this source of 
information to a large extent.  
 
Today, social media is so strongly associated with two-way communication that when an 
organization is present on social media it is almost expected to interact with the public 
(Coombs, 2014). The two-communication is a great benefit of social media when organizations 
are communicating during a crisis, and it is also noted that recipients value this feature (e.g. 
Andersen & Spitzberg, 2009; Houston et al., 2015; Steelman et al., 2015). Furthermore, 
findings suggested that interactivity between sender and receiver is the key for effective and 
valuable crisis communication during disasters (Steelman et al., 2015).  
 
Moreover, researchers have examined social media’s role regarding natural disasters such as 
earthquakes, tsunamis, fires and hurricanes (e.g. Seong & Han, 2013; Spence, Lachlan, Lin & 
del Greco, 2015). Leong et al. (2015) explored how information and communication 
technologies affect communities during natural disasters, and they argued social media could 
strengthen and empower communities. The researchers also claimed communities can develop 
and benefit from social media, and that it changes traditional crisis management due to the 
empowerment of citizens who now can take part in the crisis response themselves. Another 
aspect is how one uses the Internet differently depending on location. By comparing an 
Australian Facebook page and a Chinese Internet forum during two separate disasters, 
Kulemeka (2014) explored whether social media is used in different ways depending on where 
one is living. Even though the author highlighted several similarities between the two countries, 
there were still differences. Therefore we claim it is important to further investigate this issue 
from a Swedish perspective.  
 
In Sweden, research has been conducted about how a public organization should use social 
media during crisis (e.g. Andersson, 2014; Eriksson, 2014b; Wessling, 2013). Moreover, 
Falkheimer et al. (2009) note that research in Sweden often has a societal rather than individual 
perspective on disasters. For example, many studies have investigated how different media are 
used and what roles they play in crises (Eriksson, 2014c). Ghersetti and Westlund’s (2013) 
11 
 
study shows that people tend to turn to their regular media in crisis, although speed and mobility 
also seem to grow more important for recipients. Although Falkheimer et al. (2009) note that 
some modern research has taken a citizen perspective, we argue there is still a need for further 
investigation in this relatively new research field.  
 
In summary, we have found that the previous research within the field of Crisis Communication 
in social media have three general qualities: (1) a management perspective, (2) a focus on 
private organizations with a brand image at stake, and (3) a non-European perspective. In light 
of these three aspects, we see a knowledge gap in the research regarding how a public 
organization in Sweden can use social media during a disaster. Further, we have chosen a 
recipient perspective for our thesis, since research conducted with this perspective is still 
outnumbered by the management perspective. With this perspective, we strive to contribute 
with new insights to the field of Crisis Communication in social media, which could be of value 
for practitioners in this field. 
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3 Theoretical Framework  
In this section, we introduce the theoretical framework used throughout our thesis. Starting 
in traditional crisis communication, we then continue to presenting and discussing social 
media with its benefits and drawbacks, to finally present theories of crisis communication in 
social media. As our research field is fairly unexplored, we have carefully selected the most 
relevant research and theories in relation to our research questions.  
 
3.1 Traditional Crisis Communication 
Here we describe traditional crisis communication strategies. Even though they are not 
originally developed for social media, we find them to be of value when communicating on 
Facebook. This includes how and what to communicate during a crisis, which we will further 
discuss in relation to our empirical material in our analysis. 
 
3.1.1 Trust 
Trust is often recognized as the single most important aspect of effective crisis communication 
(Eriksson, 2009; Heath & O’Hair, 2009) and for a long time it has been a central area of 
research within the field (Eriksson, 2009). From a traditional management perspective, the 
restoration of the trust and reputation of an organization in relation to a crisis has been the main 
focus of research within crisis communication (Eriksson, 2009; 2014c) (see section 2). In 
contrast, more recent research has explored the importance of trust from a recipient perspective. 
Several studies have described how trust affects the public’s likelihood of complying with 
disaster warnings (Eriksson, 2014c; Heath & O’Hair, 2009; Rød, Botan & Holen, 2012), and 
some of them suggest the higher the trust, the higher the chance for compliance (Rød et al., 
2012; West & Orr, 2007).   
 
When communicating during a crisis, the asymmetrical relationship between the public 
organization and the public is demonstrated (Wray et al., 2006). As it is difficult for citizens to 
actually control the actions of the public organizations, they are forced to trust it to act in their 
best interest, rather than its own (Thomas, 1998). In opposite, the organization also has to trust 
the public (Thomas, 1998) because mutual trust allows for cooperation between the public and 
the organization during the crisis (Wray et al., 2006). This is argued to make crisis 
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communication more effective (Wray et al., 2006), which will be further discussed in our 
analysis (see section 5.3). Another central aspect of trust is how difficult and time consuming 
it is to build, and at the same time how devastatingly easy it is to demolish (e.g. Heath & 
O’Hair, 2009; Seeger, 2006). Moreover, researchers have found that communicating in a crisis 
is easier when trust is established before the incident (e.g. Seeger, 2006; Steelman & 
McCaffrey, 2013). 
 
Renn and Levine (1991; Heath & O’Hair, 2009) suggest trust is created through a combination 
of six components. 
 
a)  Perceived competence could be described as how knowledgeable a source is perceived 
to be, and the level of expertise is in turn dependent on factors such as status, education, 
and authority. 
b) Objectivity occurs when the public perceives the information given by the source as 
unbiased. 
c)  Fairness is achieved when all relevant opinions are represented, and not just the one 
preferable to the source. 
d) Consistency, or rather the lack of persistent inconsistency, implies how predictable the 
argument and behavior of a source is. This is based on previous actions.  
e) Sincerity is explained as how honest and open a source is perceived to communicate.   
f)  Faith could be illustrated as the public’s belief in the source having their best interest 
at heart. 
 
Since these components are dependent on each other, being stronger in one component could 
compensate for a lack in another. For example, a higher level of perceived competence or 
fairness could outweigh a lower level of objectivity (Renn & Levine, 1991). Another aspect 
which makes trust more complex and fragile, is that when one is presented with conflicting 
information “people must either change their trust of the source or their trust in their own 
observations.” (Longstaff & Yang, 2008, Introduction, para: 4). Moreover, Renn and Levine 
(1991) state it is possible to create and improve trust in a personal communicator by developing 
a context where the public can relate to that individual. They argue the public will be 
increasingly likely to identify with the communicator, and consequently more open to her 
arguments, the more sympathy she expresses for them. 
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Besides Renn and Levine, several other researchers have acknowledged the importance of trust 
in crisis communication (Eriksson, 2009). Coombs (2014) for example states that even though 
it is not explicitly referred to in all literature it “is an underlying theme” (p. 152). The author 
further argues if there is no credibility or trust for the organization, it will not matter what or 
how it communicates since the public will not believe the message anyway. Additionally, 
Eriksson (2009; 2014c) suggests that trust is affected by the medium used to transmit the crisis 
message, which will be discussed later on (see section 3.2). Moreover, also the type of source 
might matter as several studies have shown that information from friends and family is 
generally trusted to a higher degree, compared to information from governments and public 
organizations (Haynes, Barclay & Pidgeon, 2008; Steelman et al., 2015). However, it is 
important to note that the Swedish population historically has a higher degree of trust for their 
government than the rest of the world does (Eriksson, 2014c). 
 
3.1.2 What to communicate 
In the beginning of a crisis little is known about the event, and therefore the public’s need for 
information is extensive (Coombs, 2014; Falkheimer et al., 2009). According to Coombs’ 
(2014) base response there are two matters which need to be communicated in any crisis event. 
Firstly, the content of the crisis response should primarily help the public to protect themselves 
from further physical harm, referred to as instructing information. For example, the knowledge 
of when and how to evacuate an unsecure area (Sturges, 1994). Secondly, the crisis response 
should help the public cope with the event psychologically, known as adjusting information 
(Coombs, 2014). This could be accomplished by providing the public with the information of 
what happened, when, where, why and how it happened (Ammerman, 1995 & Bergman, 1994 
in Coombs, 2014; Wessling, 2013), because the fact of not knowing creates stress (Coombs, 
2014). Moreover, to communicate what actions the organization has taken to prevent the event 
from repeating itself will further help the public to cope with the situation. However, this can 
be difficult to do in the early stage of a crisis because the reason behind the crisis might still be 
unknown. Lastly, it is also necessary to express concern and sympathy for the victims of the 
crisis (Coombs, 2014).  
 
Moreover, Wessling (2013) argues it is necessary to make time to phrase an efficient message 
in times of crisis. An appropriate message expresses concern, answers the need or demand for 
information, and has the purpose to get the public to act or react in a certain way. If the message 
fails the communication becomes unclear, and the public will be confused. Furthermore, the 
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organization should recognize that there could be a difference between what information the 
public needs, and what information the public wants. If the organization focuses exclusively 
on what information the public wants, for example by only answering questions, the 
communication could become solely reactive, with the consequence that the organizations 
might forget to share other important information. At the same time, it is essential for the 
organization to answer the public’s questions, as well as to adjust incorrect information (Fors-
Andrée, 2012). If an organization does not acknowledge these questions, the relationship with 
the public might be damaged (Coombs, 2014). 
 
3.1.3 How to communicate 
In crisis communication, there are certain aspects that should be considered regarding how to 
communicate as an organization. If it does not provide a sufficient answer quickly enough, 
rumors and speculations may spread and the public might consequently lose confidence in the 
organization. Another reason for striving towards a rapid response is to get a head start, and 
take control of the communication situation, instead of letting the media publish their own 
assumptions. Therefore, a response should be given quickly, even if the organization does not 
have all the information. In such a situation, the organization should explain the lack of 
information to the public, and assure them it will come back when more is known (Fors-
Andrée, 2012). It has even been argued that the advantage of responding rapidly in the 
beginning of a crisis is higher than the risk of potential incorrectness (Coombs, 2014). 
Moreover, Fischer (2000) notes the risk of rumors being reported as facts increases when a 
response is not given quickly enough by the organization, or is lacking in detail. One example 
of a late response was during the 2004 tsunami disaster. With the exception of an appearance 
of the Swedish ambassador in Thailand, there was no political reaction from any Swedish 
officials (Strömbäck & Nord, 2006). Instead Lottie Knutson, who was Director of 
Communications at a travel agency, became the main information source (Falkheimer et al., 
2009; Strömbäck & Nord, 2006). Swedish media was of the opinion that Knutson had 
communicated in an efficient and empathetic way (Falkheimer et al., 2009). The Swedish 
government, on the other hand, received severe criticism in the media for its behavior 
(Strömbäck & Nord, 2006).  
 
A second aspect for the organization to consider is to speak to the public with one voice, 
because consistent statements are easier to believe than conflicting ones. One way to do this, 
is to keep employees updated about the situation, which increases the chance of them giving 
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correct information to individuals around them (Coombs, 2014). In turn this minimizes the risk 
of employees communicating different messages (Fors-Andrée, 2012). A third aspect is the 
importance of communicating openly. This means the organization has to make itself 
accessible, be prepared to reveal information, and to be honest (Coombs, 2014), which could 
be related to Renn and Levine’s (1991) component of trust named sincerity (see section 3.1.1). 
 
3.1.4 A local aspect 
During a crisis, local and national media traditionally cover the event differently (Cohen, 
Hughes & White, 2007; Fischer, 2000). It is stated that local media is of more use than national 
media for spreading vital information to the affected public, such as evacuation plans (Fischer, 
2000). Local media also has a higher credibility among local residents, because they provide 
more accurate and relevant information (Cohen et al., 2007). We claim this is relevant in crisis 
communication, because if the goal is to make the public take action, a message which affects 
them is more likely to make them act accordingly (Wessling, 2013). In comparison, national 
media holds a more general perspective, reporting on how the public is reacting, and who to 
blame for it (Fischer, 2000). Cohen et al. (2007) argue the more general and non-local focus 
could make the public disregard the information, which we claim could have devastating 
consequences during a disaster. Additionally, wildfires often initially spread too quickly for 
the mass media to report on it, and the public is forced to turn to each other for information 
(Steelman et al., 2015). For example Shklovski, Palen and Sutton (2008) found that the public 
turns to individuals with direct access to accurate information about the event, such as 
emergency staff, or individuals who had defied evacuation orders and remained in the area.  
 
3.2 Crisis Communication in Social Media 
Here we discuss and problematize how social media has changed crisis communication over 
the past years. We present how the speed and reach of social media could possibly be both 
beneficial in crisis situations, but also how this could make crisis communication more difficult. 
 
Social media could be defined as Internet-based media with user-generated content, which 
allow individuals to interact synchronously or asynchronously (Carr and Hayes, 2015). 
Furthermore, social media provides the possibility to rapidly distribute extensive volumes of 
information to the public (White, 2012), but also to have both broad and narrow audiences 
(Carr and Hayes, 2015). Additionally, as an online communication tool, it enables two-way 
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interaction in form of posting content, commenting on posts and receiving responses (Void n.d, 
referred in Coombs, 2014). 
 
Ten years ago the concept of crisis communication in social media did not exist, while today it 
is a necessary tool for handling a crisis effectively (Fors-Andrée, 2012). As mentioned above, 
social media is an effective medium for two-way communication. During a crisis it presents a 
possibility to rapidly get a message across to the public (Wessling, 2013), as well as answer 
questions on what, why and how the event happened (Fors-Andrée, 2012; Wessling, 2013), 
which relates to Coombs’ (2014) second base response (see section 3.1.2). Moreover, in a crisis 
the members of the public are often the first ones on site (Wessling, 2013; White, 2012), and 
therefore, if mutual trust (see section 3.1.1) is established, the public could quickly supply the 
public organizations with information (Wessling 2013). As social media provides the 
possibility for the public to share information directly from the scene (White, 2012), we argue 
this information could be locally connected. 
 
Furthermore, crisis communication in social media does not only involve communicating 
verified information and facts (Eriksson, 2009). Because of the public character of social media 
where multiple voices could spread their own opinions and experiences of a crisis (Coombs & 
Holladay, 2014), there is also a dimension of correcting disinformation and dispelling rumors 
(Eriksson, 2009; Fors-Andrée, 2012). In order for the organization to do so, it needs to be 
considered as a credible source of information by the public (Coombs, 2014). This relates to 
Coombs’ (2014) crisis base response, whereas the public is more likely to put their confidence 
in an organization that is perceived to have the public’s best interests as their main priority 
(Coombs, 2014). Moreover, it has been argued that too much information to process, from too 
many sources, could create message overload, and ironically lead to information loss (Coombs, 
2014). Based on the argument above, it is easy to make the assumption there would be a 
constant information overload on social media, such as Facebook. However, White (2012) 
claims social media reduces information overload by filtering information according to the 
individuals’ preferences. In other words, the public acts as “an informal recommendation 
system” (Starbird et al., 2010, cited in Starbird & Palen, 2010). 
 
Coombs (2014) additionally suggests a four-step approach to crisis communication in social 
media. Firstly, the organization needs to be present on social media during the crisis. This 
relates to Wessling (2013) who claims that a public organization which normally has a social 
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media presence, cannot choose to avoid the medium during a crisis, as well as Fors-Andrée 
(2012) who states that all platforms where the organization is present have to be managed. 
Secondly, the crisis needs to be handled on the platform where it originated (Coombs, 2014). 
However this specific approach do not apply on natural disaster since events such as wildfires 
do not occur online. Thirdly, it is more effective to implement social media in a crisis response 
if the organization already has a presence there before the crisis, because this adds to the 
organization’s credibility and authenticity (Coombs, 2014). This further relates to Seeger 
(2006) as well as Steelman and McCaffrey (2013), who argue it is difficult to create trust during 
an ongoing crisis (see section 3.1.1). Fourthly, the organization needs to always be polite on 
social media (Coombs, 2014), which will be discussed further in the next section. 
 
Primarily, the organization needs to respond calmly and professionally even to hostile 
comments from the public (Coombs, 2014), and it should not become absorbed by the jargon 
(Eriksson, 2014b). This is especially important, because in a crisis the affected public could be 
sensitive to certain wordings (Fors-Andrée, 2012). Thereafter, the organization should follow 
the rules of the platform on which it is communicating (Coombs, 2014). For example, on 
Facebook, we perceive the tone used is mostly personal and informal and therefore the 
organization should strive to communicate accordingly. 
 
The tone used by an organization on social media also helps to create the public’s perception 
of the organization. For example, a too formal tone indirectly emphasizes a distance between 
the organization and the public, while a personal tone is significantly more engaging. 
Moreover, when an urgent message is delivered in a simple language and with a personal tone, 
the message itself becomes more easily understood. One way for a public organization to 
appear more personal is for the employees to sign with their first name when answering the 
public’s questions on social media (Andersson, 2014). Also White (2012) argues a human 
aspect is engaging and sympathetic. However, a personal tone is not equivalent to a private 
tone, and Andersson (2014) states it is important for the employees to remember they are still 
representatives for a public organization, even though the communication is taking place in 
social media.  
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4 Methodology 
In our methodology section we present the research approach applied and discussed 
throughout this thesis. Then, we present the methods used and the motives behind the collection 
of our empirical material, the sample selection, methods of analysis for the material, and the 
implications and limitations with these methods. 
 
4.1 Research Approach 
As the field of Strategic Communication views the recipient as an active and interpreting being, 
rather than a passive one (Eksell & Thelander, 2014), this thesis views communication as 
something individuals interpret in different ways. Therefore, we use a social constructionist 
approach, which is based in the hermeneutic tradition (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2008). This 
means we see the world as socially constructed by individuals interacting with each other, and 
that the only thing one can know about the world, and how it is constructed, is how individuals 
interpret it (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2008). 
 
From this perspective, the creation of meaning is a social process constructed through 
communication with others (Falkheimer & Heide, 2014), and is constantly created and 
changing (Bryman, 2011). Thus, the experience of crisis communication in social media is 
perceived in different ways by different individuals. To explore these perceptions we therefore 
utilized qualitative methods and asking individuals how they interpreted communication on 
Facebook during the wildfire. As the results of qualitative studies are not meant to be replicated 
nor to be considered absolute (Bryman, 2011), we rather present them as suggestions of how 
public organizations could resolve communication issues during a crisis. Furthermore, our 
methods are abductive, meaning that the authors alternate between theory and empirical data, 
allowing the understanding for the material to grow during the process (Trost, 2010). 
 
4.2 Collection of Empirical Material 
4.2.1 Online documents 
As a starting point for our research, we read approximately 20 news articles on the topic and 
studied the first official report about the wildfire from the County Administrative Board of 
Västmanland (LV, 2014). We then observed several Facebook groups and pages that organized, 
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created or otherwise distributed information about the wildfire. We searched for central ideas, 
concepts, and opinions frequently mentioned among Facebook members. This information 
later served as a foundation for our interview guide, which we will discuss further on (see 
section 4.4).  
 
4.2.2 Interviews 
To gain a broader understanding, we decided on individual interviews. This method is common 
when a researcher seeks to find information that is not immediately observable, such as 
thoughts, emotions and interpretations (Merriam, 2006). Interviews can also be of use when 
the researcher wants to investigate something in the past, which is not likely to occur again 
(Merriam, 2006). We argue the wildfire in Västmanland is an example of such an event.  
 
The conducted interviews were unstructured, which is argued to be suitable when the 
researcher wants to uncover the interviewees’ opinions, rather than to let her own reflections 
and subjective interpretations color the material (Merriam, 2006). The questions were kept 
open-ended to further see how the respondent naturally associated the question (Bryman, 
2011). Our respondents were then asked follow-up questions (Merriam, 2006), to further 
explore individual ideas and to avoid misinterpretations. To better understand the respondents 
and their involvement during the wildfire, our interview guide (see Appendix 2) included 
questions regarding how they usually use Facebook, as well as during the days of wildfire. 
Further questions explored what preferences our respondents had of the information content, 
and how they wanted to receive it on Facebook during a crisis event. The execution of these 
interviews is discussed further on (see 4.4).  
 
4.3 Sample Selection 
Our selection was a convenience sample (Bryman, 2011), as our criteria for being interviewed 
were few: (a) The respondent lived in the affected area, and (b) The respondent used Facebook 
to keep herself updated about of the wildfire. To recruit interviewees, we contacted local 
organizations, posted in several Facebook groups and used our own personal contacts in the 
area. To get as many interviewees as possible, we then used a network (i.e. snowball) selection 
(Bryman, 2011; Merriam, 2006) asking our interviewees to refer us to others involved who 
might be interested in our research. As Yin (2013) notes, it is important to remember that 
respondents found through a convenience sample do not always hold the most important or 
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relevant information. However, due to our social constructionist perspective (Alvesson & 
Sköldberg, 2008), we mean this is of less importance, because we are interested in any opinion, 
and do not value them as more or less important. Although we did not have the possibility to 
choose our interviewees ourselves, we are satisfied with our sample selection, because the 
respondents demonstrated a great variety of experiences, opinions, ideas and beliefs, which is 
emphasized by the social constructionist perspective (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2008). 
 
4.4 Procedure 
The interviews were conducted between April 16 and April 21, 2015. Nine of the eleven 
interviews were conducted face to face in different municipalities in the County of 
Västmanland, and the additional two were held over the telephone. The interviewees were aged 
between 30 and 65, one of whom was male and ten of whom were female. The small number 
of male interviewees was unintended, but we still mean our empirical material are of value as 
Bryman (2011) states that in qualitative studies, findings can be of interest even when 
representation of the interviewees do not reflect the reality.  
 
Due to the time passed between the wildfire and our interviews, the respondents’ memories of 
specific events, and their participation on Facebook might have faded. However, after the 
interviews, it became clear what an emotionally strenuous experience the event had been to 
them. Therefore the time passed had most likely given our interviewees an opportunity to 
reflect on the event, which according to Trost (2010) could give a more composed and less 
emotionally colored empirical material to base the analysis on.  
 
The interviews lasted from 25 to 70 minutes. However, Bryman (2011) claims that even if 
interviews differ in lengths, shorter conversations can still provide valuable insights to the 
topic. In our case, the difference in length was mainly due to the following reasons:  Firstly, 
the variation of locations for the interviews. Depending on where the interviewee felt the most 
comfortable the interviews were held in conference rooms, library group study rooms, and 
private homes. As Trost (2010) suggests, there are more distractions in the interviewee’s home, 
but this type of location can also allow for a wider understanding for the interviewee and its 
perspective (Bryman, 2011). Secondly, to show sympathy and respect for our interviewees, we 
gave them time to explain not only their experience of the communication on Facebook, but 
also their personal view on this tragic event. The variation in length could therefore be 
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explained by different individuals having different emotional needs to express themselves. 
Moreover, two of the interviews were held over telephone, as these interviewees were unable 
to meet with us in person. Bryman (2011) points out that when conducting telephone 
interviews, the interviewer cannot evaluate the body language of the respondent for social cues. 
However, as our responses shared similarities in depth and topics, we argue our telephone 
interviews equivalents the interviews conducted face to face.  
 
All interviews were held in Swedish, and the quotations in this thesis were therefore translated 
into English. Theoretically, there might be some loss of meaning due to this translation, 
however we have tried to stay as close to the original meaning as possible. The interviewees 
all verbally gave their informed consent to us recording their interviews and were offered a 
copy of the final thesis, as is often recommended (e.g. Bryman, 2011; Kvale & Brinkmann, 
2009; Trost, 2010). All respondents were treated anonymously in this thesis, with respect to 
their personal integrity (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Hence, all names presented in this thesis 
are fabricated and unisex. Although in order to facilitate reading of this thesis, and to not give 
the identity of the one male participant away, we refer to all our interviewees as “she”. 
 
4.5 Method of Analysis 
Because of our socially constructed perspective (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2008), also 
researchers inevitably construct their own perception of the world from their experiences and 
ideas (Bryman, 2011). We have attempted to keep this in mind when interpreting our material, 
in order to achieve reflexive objectivity which means that one actively questions and challenges 
one’s subjective views (Kvale & Brinkmann, 2009). Still, these views might be reflected in the 
interpretations of the empirical material, and therefore also in the conclusions drawn from them 
(Bryman, 2011; Merriam 2006). 
 
As our methods were abductive, we continuously analyzed our material throughout the thesis. 
Kvale and Brinkmann (2009) claim that when the researcher starts to see patterns in the 
material, saturation of information is achieved. Bryman (2011) on the other hand argues 
saturation is accomplished when another interview would not give more information or 
knowledge. In our opinion, we have observed patterns in our empirical material, but we also 
acknowledge it can be difficult to know what the next interview might have revealed. Hence, 
a few more interviews could have helped us to ensure we had discovered the most common 
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patterns. However due to the constraints of this thesis, this was not possible. All interviews 
were recorded on several devices and then transcribed to prevent any answers from being 
forgotten. As mentioned earlier (see section 4.1), due to our abductive methods, the analysis of 
the responses was ongoing and occurred simultaneously with the conducting of the interviews. 
However, the transcripts made a more thorough analysis possible, and decreased eventual 
misinterpretations.  
 
As a first step to analyze our material we read the individual interviewees’ answers, which is 
often called vertical analysis (Thomsson 2002). We then analyzed the meaning of the 
quotations to uncover underlying topics between interviewees, called horizontal analysis 
(Thomsson, 2002). This is what Thomsson (2002) titles reflexive analysis, where the researcher 
looks beyond the actual words to find underlying mechanisms in an ongoing process, which 
we argue is suitable for our unstructured interviews. Furthermore, as our research is abductive, 
our material was continuously related to theories. The topics we found were then actively 
questioned and revised throughout the process to best present the underlying meanings.  
 
4.6 Methodological Considerations 
Today, the quality of qualitative research is preferably judged in trustworthiness, rather than in 
validity and reliability (Daymon & Holloway, 2011), hence we have chosen the former. 
Trustworthiness is evaluated by four criteria (Daymon & Holloway, 2011), which will now be 
discussed. 
 
Credibility (Daymon & Holloway, 2011) is argued due to the rich and detailed material 
collected onsite in Västmanland. As mentioned earlier (see section 4.4), a possible drawback 
is the time passed between the disaster and our interviews. Due to the fact that participation 
was voluntarily and all respondents had much to contribute with, we acknowledge that their 
opinions might have been polarized. However, as the respondents are treated anonymously, 
they therefore might be more open and honest in their answers (Bryman, 2011) which we argue 
further improves the credibility. 
 
Dependability (Daymon & Holloway, 2011) is strengthened by transparency of the decisions 
made throughout the thesis. Moreover, to achieve consistency the interviews followed an open 
interview guide (see Appendix 2) and one of the authors acted as main questioner. Therefore 
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all predetermined questions were posed in a similar manner. However, as the interviews 
continued our knowledge increased, which might have affected our follow-up questions. As 
we are aware of the risk of pre-understanding, we actively kept an open mind for new insight 
during the interviews. 
 
Confirmability (Daymon & Holloway, 2011) is increased as our empirical material has been 
systematically and repeatedly processed by all three authors. Moreover, in the quotations we 
have strived to reflect the respondents’ views as openly as possible, and by presenting the 
quotations throughout our discussion we facilitate for the reader to asses if we have managed 
to remain unbiased. 
 
Even though we are aware we cannot make any statistically general conclusion based on our 
findings, we mean they have transferability (Daymon & Holloway, 2011) since we exemplify 
how our findings might be applied to public organizations in Sweden during a disaster. Further, 
the findings are based on respondents varying in age, occupation and extent to which they wre 
affected by the wildfire. This might make the findings transferable to a wider population, even 
though male respondents were underrepresented. However, due the speed of which social 
media is changing, the transferability should be taken with caution.  
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5 Results and Discussion 
Here we present our empirical material which we explore and elaborate in relation to the 
theories introduced in our theoretical framework. Firstly, the four elements we have found in 
our empirical material are presented and reflected upon separately. In order to understand the 
complexity of the elements in their mutual context, they are thereafter once again intertwined 
and further discussed as we demonstrate relations to, and gaps in, the existing theories. 
 
After going through all of our empirical material we found four consistent elements: quick, 
correct, local and personal. All of them concerned concrete aspects of crisis communication 
in social media. We are aware these elements are not independent and cannot be understood 
outside their context, as well as that they in practice are not entirely separable, but in fact highly 
intertwined. However, for the sake of the discussion we mean it is important to highlight certain 
aspects in order to better understand the material. We found that our respondents wanted 
correct and local information, to be communicated in a quick and personal manner, which will 
now be discussed.  
 
As we found our four elements to be both influencing, and influenced by trust, we would like 
to start our analysis with a few words on this common denominator. The respondents 
mentioned trust in one way or another, without us first asking about it. They had very different 
experiences of trust in relation to public organizations during the fire. Early on, we found it 
interesting that those who held a positive view of the public organization, had very unspecified 
reasons for doing so: 
 
”Well it’s an authority that stands for, I don’t know… Safety and good organization”  
- Charlie 
 
”My personal idea about this, based on what happened, is that if an organization like a 
municipality or someone in charge at a municipality […] Because the average Joe often 
trusts the municipality more than he trusts an individual. - Francis 
 
The quotations above illustrate the imprecise motives for trusting a public organization. We 
suggest one reason for this is the generally high trust the Swedish public has for authorities, as 
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mentioned earlier (see section 3.1.1). Another reason might be that trust takes a long time to 
build (Heath & O’Hair, 2009), which could make it more difficult for people to remember 
specific events related to the organization which made it trustworthy. In contrast, respondents 
who held a negative view had more specific and personal examples of why they did not trust 
public organizations: 
 
”[I] had no contact with any authorities whatsoever. No, not at all. No one came here to help 
me. No nothing. So we had to make all our decisions ourselves. […] With hindsight, what you 
feel… my trust for the authorities in a situation like this, it’s basically gone.” - Taylor 
 
We found that the respondents were disappointed with the public organizations. Just as the 
satisfied interviewees, the unhappy did seem to have had trust in the public organization before 
the wildfire. As Taylor exemplifies, for a specific reason she now felt abandoned by the 
organization, and consequently did not trust it anymore. We therefore agree with Heath and 
O’Hair (2009) who argue that trust for an organization is easily damaged. On the other hand, 
one could argue that it is contradicted by what seems to be a stable relationship between Francis 
and the public organization. However, we argue that no matter how strong a relationship seems 
to be, it is just as easily destroyed as Taylor demonstrates. Moreover, Drew highlighted yet 
another aspect of trust in crisis communication: 
 
”But of course, if they would say ‘You ARE going to evacuate’, and then change their minds 
after an hour or so, then it wouldn’t be as believable, in a way. Then I would think ‘OK, so 
what do they mean, are we, or are we not going to [evacuate]?’ and then eventually you start 
to make your own decisions… So I guess that’s the risk, that you lose your trust for the 
authority.” - Drew 
 
Drew pointed out that if the public loses trust in a public organization during a disaster, there 
is a chance of people making their own decisions. This further relates to if the public does not 
trust the organization, it might not follow instructions (Rød et al., 2012; West & Orr, 2007), 
which we argue in times of disaster could be life-threatening. As trust is important for all four 
of our elements, we will now continue to discuss trust in relation to each element separately. 
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5.1 The Quick Element 
During the wildfire there were interviewees who wanted to receive information from the public 
organizations as soon as there was any available. One respondent made a comparison with live 
sport updates:  
 
 “It’s kind of like when you are watching a sport event for example, there you also get like, 
‘live’ [updates], and then someone reports, well, like short [posts].” - Morgan 
 
She wanted constant updates about the wildfire, not only information about where the fire was 
currently situated, but also who was affected and what was done about it. If seen as a metaphor, 
Morgan did not only wish to know the result of the game, i.e. if the wildfire was extinguished 
or not, but also the continuous struggle between the two teams, i.e. the wildfire and the 
firefighters. This could mean periods of more frequent information updates, alternated with 
periods of fewer updates. Respondents also stressed the desire for immediate updates and a 
constant flow of information:  
 
 “Then [the County Administrative Board] quickly made a Facebook page and it was 
GREAT! They wrote all the time, updated, not only once a day, but basically every morning 
and every evening, and if something else happened, they wrote about that too.” - Erin 
 
” [...] because if something happens, if it’s something big, then I want to know, then I want to 
have a look. We’re a bit impatient today.” - Alex 
 
We suggest this relates to Coombs (2014), who notes that especially in the beginning of a 
disaster the need for information is extensive. Wessling (2013) on the other hand stresses the 
need to formulate a clear and concise message in order to avoid confusion among the public. 
The message should also be sympathetic and provide the information needed, with the goal to 
make the public behave as wanted. In times of crisis, we argue that it could be a challenge to 
give a rapid response that is also well formulated and easily understood. This will be discussed 
further on (see section 5.2).   
 
A surprising aspect of rapid communication was how respondents experienced that quick 
information led to more information. We suggest, a possible explanation might be that one 
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single update, no matter how comprehensive, is still considered less than several shorter 
updates. Moreover, as respondents wanted immediate updates during the wildfire (see p. 27), 
summarized and consequently less immediate posts could therefore be regarded as less 
valuable. For example, even though the posts may contain more information, the information 
in question might no longer be of use or even valid. A respondent mentioned one additional 
reason why longer updates may be less appreciated: 
 
 “It’s a stressful situation. It always gets like that when you are close by, or in a situation like 
this, and then it is harder to stay focused on long articles.” - Alex 
 
Yet another aspect of quick response is the chance of public organizations screening 
information, and therefore details irrelevant to a majority of the public, but still relevant to one 
specific individual, might be left out. On the other hand, if information is communicated less 
quickly, it allows the public organization more time to detect and correct misinformation. This 
aspect will be further discussed (see section 5.2). Moreover, from our social constructionist 
perspective (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2008), we see another potential difficulty of responding 
quickly. Quickly is a relative word, which most likely has different connotations for different 
individuals. We further suggest, that meaning could also change within the same individual, 
depending on the situation. For example, depending on how immediate the actual danger is, 
the timespan of quickly might change. Charlie and Drew exemplified this dilemma in their 
quotations: 
 
 “Depending on what it is. If you think of that Tuesday, or whenever it was, that Monday, 
when it was burning like hell, three kilometers per hour. Then an hour [between updates] 
was a really long time.” - Charlie 
 
 “If it’s an intense situation, well, then maybe more information should be posted, more often 
kind of… And maybe later you could post less often, so to speak. Maybe sometimes it’s 
enough with a short post that says ‘The situation is stable, we have everything under 
control.’” - Drew 
 
Charlie mentioned the most critical day of the disaster, when the fire was moving with extreme 
speed and quintupled in size (see Appendix 3). During this period she thought that an interval 
of one hour between Facebook updates was too long. We argue that Facebook makes it possible 
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to adapt the frequency of posting after the public’s need, partly because there are barely any 
gatekeepers who control the information flow (Steelman et al., 2015), and partly because of 
the norm to update frequently. Moreover, Drew highlighted another aspect when she wanted 
updates even if the situation was currently stable, and there was no new information to report. 
However, others disagreed with her on this matter. For example, one interviewee mentioned 
that when she did not receive notifications from Facebook, she understood there was no new 
information available which calmed her. However, she further stressed others could be of 
different opinions:  
 
 “I thought [the amount of updates] was just right, but there were some disagreements about 
that, and I mean that if you are a bit more nervous or hysterical, then you want to have 
information all the time, even though there is none.” - Francis 
 
Francis argued individuals who are anxious could have a greater need for more frequent 
updates. Another reason for why some might want to receive updates more often might be the 
level of trust the respondent holds against the organization. For example a person, who feels 
confident she will get updates when there is new information available, might not want constant 
posts about nothing. In contrast, a person who distrusts an organization might believe the 
organization is withholding information from her when there is no new information to obtain 
on Facebook. The example above reflects sincerity, which is one of Renn and Levine’s (1991) 
components of trust. It implies that if an organization is not perceived as communicating openly 
and honestly the people might believe it is not sharing all the information with them, which in 
turn could hurt the trust of the organization. In addition, we are of the opinion that if an 
organization does not provide information quickly enough, it could be perceived as 
unknowledgeable and not updated on the current state of the disaster. This in turn could be 
related to the component perceived competence 
 
Another aspect of openness specific for public organizations is that as a subject of the principle 
of public access to information, the public organization is obligated to answer the questions 
from the public as soon as possible (See Appendix 4). Moreover, if they do not, it could hurt 
the trust built between them (Coombs, 2014). Among our respondents we found both those 
who were satisfied and those who were dissatisfied with the public organizations’ efforts to 
answer questions on Facebook. For example both Erin and Robin stressed the importance of 
answering questions rapidly during the wildfire: 
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 “And as soon as you wrote a question you got a reply! And then you could look at a question 
[on Facebook], click ‘Replies’, and you got all the information!” - Erin 
 
 “Especially in a situation like this, you should respond as soon as possible if it’s an actual 
question. The ones that are more… You know like, sometimes a thread takes on a life of its 
own, and in that case those responsible don’t have to interfere.” - Robin 
 
Robin also mentioned the possibility of other individuals to answer the questions themselves, 
instead of the public organization doing so. However, when a large amount of people ask for a 
lot of information at once, we argue it demands manpower the organization might not have. 
 
Moreover, as Wessling (2013) problematizes, there is a risk the communication becomes 
reactive, rather than proactive when solely focusing on answering questions. The organization 
might lose the holistic perspective, and with it, the remembrance to share vital information the 
public might not be asking for. Moreover, we argue the extensive amount of information 
shared, not only by public organizations, but also by private individuals on Facebook and other 
online media during the wildfire, could have created an information overload. Interviewees 
described this information flow as troublesome: 
 
 “The feed flourished with people describing what they had seen and done, and pictures they 
had taken. So it was an unbelievable mix of information.” - Alex 
 
 “In the end there was such an incredible amount [of information] that I couldn’t manage.” 
 - Charlie 
 
 “Well, the feed shouldn’t be too cluttered ‘cause then the message itself will drown.”  
- Francis 
 
Our findings highlighted the extensive volume of information that circulated on Facebook 
during the time of the wildfire. Furthermore, Francis pointed out that one of the risks with 
information overload is that important information might be lost in the masses. Also Coombs 
(2014) mentions that too much information could ironically lead to information dearth. We 
argue that this is one of the problematic aspects of Facebook as a crisis communication tool. In 
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contrast, White (2012) notes that social media often solve this problem by filtering the 
information flow for its users. However, we have not found support for this theory in our 
empirical material. Still, we are aware that neither the respondents nor we could know what 
the information flow would have contained without the filtering. Moreover, respondents 
presented ambiguous attitudes towards the information volume. For example one respondent 
did recognize an overload, but at the same time she excused it by arguing the information might 
be relevant for someone else:  
 
 “No information is unnecessary. [...][I’d rather have] too much than too little. Even if it 
becomes too much, you can decide ‘this doesn’t concern me right now’, and then you can just 
skip it. What doesn’t concern me concerns someone else [...] you do get a little sick of it, but 
that doesn’t matter in a crisis situation.” - Parker 
 
Another downside of not communicating quickly enough is the risk of causing rumors to spread 
(Fors-Andrée, 2012). Rumors were an issue in our findings, and the topic was frequently 
brought up. We argue that the rumors might even be psychologically exhausting, especially 
when regarding critical information. For example as Drew described, the emotional strain of 
not knowing if one’s house had burned to the ground or not: 
 
 “There were so many rumors circulating and it wasn’t until then I felt like there has to be 
INFORMATION somewhere, because you can get really upset and sad if you hear something 
like that. And [my friends] didn’t really know if their house was still standing or not, because 
they weren’t allowed to return.” - Drew 
 
We argue that this relates to Coombs’ (2014) second base response, about helping the public 
to cope psychologically with the event. Even if information about the situation is scarce, Fors-
Andrée (2012) argues that it is still necessary to communicate in order to explain the lack of 
information, and to ensure the public that any new information will be shared.  
 
However as Francis mentioned (see p. 29), how to cope with a situation like the wildfire is 
highly individual. For example some might want constant updates, while others only want 
updates when new information is available. Based on this, we argue that the individual 
differences make it more difficult for a public organization to please the public as a whole, and 
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according to the social constructionist perspective (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2008) there is not 
one public interpretation but rather an abundance of individual interpretations. 
 
5.2 The Correct Element 
As previously discussed, it is important to communicate quickly in a crisis. However doing so 
increases the risk of communicating incorrect information (Coombs, 2014). We argue this 
creates a contradictory relationship between quick and correct, and a difficult balancing act for 
the public organization. Coombs (2014) claims the advantage of communicating quickly 
outweigh the risk of incorrectness. One of our respondents partially agreed with this quotation. 
At the same time she was critical of the confidence with which the public organization 
expressed their message in the example below. According to her, not only were they wrong, 
but also they gave her a promise they could not keep: 
 
”Preferably quickly, maybe a liiittle incorrect, but this was just so wrong. Everything was 
depending on these planes. They could have said ‘We hope they will be here in three days’ 
instead of saying ‘They are coming now!’ when they aren’t. Because that’s like, like an 
emotional rollercoaster.” - Erin 
 
Due to the crucial nature of the arrival of the water bombing airplanes to save the respondent’s 
home, Erin was emotionally involved in the issue and consequently more easily distressed. If 
the matter would have been less important to her, she might have been more forgiving towards 
the public organization. However, there were respondents who had even stronger opinions on 
potentially incorrect information: 
 
“It just can’t happen. You have to make sure [it’s true] and read it through before you  
post it.” - Charlie 
 
 “One says this, one says that. So once again I think that it’s better to say nothing, than to say 
something wrong, in this situation.” - Jamie 
 
These quotations contradict Coombs’ (2014) previous statement about prioritizing quick 
information over correct information. Again we see a variety of opinions in our findings. Both 
correct and quick information was demanded, and there was no belief that one had to exclude 
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the other. However, one respondent highlighted this difficulty and suggested a possible 
approach: 
 
 “If you talk about a bigger accident, it might not be absolutely necessary to know the exact 
number of injured, how they were injured or what type of injuries. But maybe it’s very 
important to know that it has happened, since it’s blocking the roads somewhere. And that 
there are many injured, but maybe not the exact number.” - Alex   
 
She argues it is not necessary to be too specific about the event itself, but to be rather general 
about it. In contrast, Coombs (2014) claims the importance of communicating openly, which 
means that an organization should be honest as well as reveal available information. Therefore 
we argue that withholding details could create stress among the public. One example during 
this disaster was the confusion of where the fire was actually situated. One of our respondents 
described the lack of details made her unaware of the danger she was in:   
 
”For us Sala is 35 kilometers away, but the municipality border is just up here in the woods. 
And [the fire] was just on the other side of that border, but that’s not how you think. Sala is 
the town. If they would’ve said ‘there’s a fire in the woods between Fagersta and Sala’, then 
we would have understood. But now, we thought ‘it’s just a small fire in Sala.’” - Erin 
 
Erin explained the need for more precise information, since it would have made her understand 
its personal relevance for her. However, the element of local information is worthy a discussion 
of its own (see section 5.3) 
 
We argue that another aspect of correct information is the need for validation, to assess what 
information is true, and which information is not. There were respondents who even felt the 
need to validate information they received from public organizations. Above all, it was the 
interviewees in immediate danger that seemed to have a greater need for validation, and 
particularly those with animals that would be difficult to evacuate all of a sudden. Taylor 
exemplified this when saying:   
 
 “But there was such an extreme amount of information and I came to the conclusion that you 
had to verify all of it. So you couldn’t take everything seriously, and you had to know exactly 
what information to trust.” - Taylor 
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Furthermore, Taylor was also responsible for other individuals’ animals and explained she had 
contact with a lot of people during the fire. We claim it might have been because of this 
responsibility, she felt a need to validate all the information she received. Moreover, 
respondents did not feel a great need for validation when receiving information from the 
Municipal Commissioner of Norberg, Åsa Eriksson, which will be exemplified and discussed 
further on (see section 5.4).  
 
In terms of validating information from public organizations on Facebook, we found that trust 
was diminished even if the respondents had not been personally affected by incorrect 
information. It seemed like it was enough to have heard about others who had received incorrect 
information to affect their trust. For example, Drew described how her friends did not receive 
information about whether or not their house was still standing, (see p. 31), and Taylor 
explained how a family received misinformation about being allowed to return home after the 
evacuation: 
 
”I think this was on Tuesday they got the opportunity to come home, it said so on the County 
Administrative Board’s Facebook page. And they just flew up, into the car and drove 
extremely fast. And the police [by the barricade] just said ‘we don’t take any orders from 
[the County Administrative Board]’ and then [the family] almost went rabid and broke down 
of course. They just stood there for two hours before they were allowed in.” - Taylor 
 
We argue, even though the Swedish population generally has a high level of trust for public 
organizations (Eriksson, 2014c), incidents of this kind could affect their trust, and increase the 
public’s need for validation. Moreover we suggest that this relates to one of Renn and Levine’s 
(1991) components of trust, namely consistency that stresses the impact an organization’s past 
actions have on people’s trust in the present. In relation to social media, we argue that this 
aspect is even more important. Due to the fact that what is written online remains there 
(Coombs, 2014; Fors-Andrée, 2012), we argue that misinformation from a public organization 
during a current or past crisis is easily found by the public. Moreover, based on quotations we 
suggest that recently published misinformation affected the people extensively. Additionally, 
because of the network quality of Facebook, bad experiences do not only affect the trust of the 
individuals involved, but it could also potentially affect any of their Facebook friends. We 
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argue that this, in combination with the speed of social media mean that one single incident 
could have wide impact on the trust of an organization. 
 
Another example of validation is presented by one of our respondents who compared the 
Facebook page of the County Administrative Board of Västmanland with information from 
other sources. By validating information she could determine the trustworthiness of the page: 
 
”[The County Administrative Board] was the only [Facebook page] I felt was working [...] 
because when I got information from elsewhere it proved to be correct.” - Erin 
 
Erin described that she trusted this Facebook page because its information corresponded with 
the other sources she used. We argue based on this quotation and her previous statements (see 
p. 34), that she was able to forgive imprecise information from the public organization. 
However, even though we do not know how more severe misinformation would have affected 
Erin’s trust, it clearly difference to Drew and Taylor whose trust in the public organization was 
diminished instantly. In our opinion, the imprecise information Erin received from the public 
organization about how close the fire was to her (see p. 35), was as severe as the misinformation 
Drew and Taylor mentioned. Once again we see a correlation to our social constructionist 
perspective (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2008); how a person defines, and handles, misinformation 
is highly individual, which makes the communication situation more complex for the public 
organization. 
 
Due to the high complexity of the public, the task of communicating can be complicated, as 
frequently discussed in this thesis. To further elaborate our discussion about the public’s need 
for getting their questions answered (see p. 30), we argue that replying to questions could be a 
possible way for a public organization to handle this complexity. For example, if a public 
organization answers one person’s question, we argue it could satisfy her momentary need. 
This can be seen as a part of Coombs’ (2014) base response, to both help the public to avoid 
immediate danger and to cope with the crisis psychologically. Respondents mentioned getting 
replies to their questions during our interviews: 
 
 “[I was] VERY happy with the [County Administrative Board’s Facebook page]. Because 
you could write a question, and then they replied right away. So there was staff there all the 
time, on the Facebook page. That was great.” - Jamie 
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 “So it worked really well and it wasn’t just one way. If I call, I will only get the answer to 
what I’m asking, but there, I could get the answers to everyones’ questions. That’s great. I 
might not know that I was wondering something, but when I see the answer I realize ’It was 
good I got to know that.’” - Erin 
 
Jamie was pleased with the quick response, and Erin described a possible benefit of getting 
questions answered on Facebook. Because of the public nature of the platform, the questions 
are for anyone to see and benefit from. Therefore, we argue that Facebook has the possibility 
to reach others than those expected, which might lead to a better informed public. The public 
organization could also correct misinformation by answering questions (Fors-Andrée, 2012), 
as one interviewee exemplified: 
 
”[They said on the radio] that ’Today the planes will finally arrive, today they are starting 
water bombing’ […] ’Stay away because we’re going to water bomb now’. [Pause] But then, 
in our heads we understood that what the hell are they going to water bomb here for? The 
fire isn’t here. So people went hysterical. Old men and ladies came running with their 
walking frames. So people wrote to the County Administrative Board on Facebook, ‘get new 
information out there, this isn’t right’. So we went crazy. I don’t know how long it took them 
to post new information, but I mean it was long enough to raise your pulse so to speak.” 
 - Charlie 
 
In this case, Facebook was not only used by the public organization to correct misinformation, 
but also by the public to alert the organization about their mistake. Thus, the public could be 
seen as a resource for the public organization because they can report and correct 
misinformation. When applying the quotation from Longstaff and Yang (2008) (see section 
3.1.1), Charlie’s quotation further highlights an aspect of trust. We argue that Charlie had to 
decide whether or not to trust her own observation, that there was no fire in sight, or she had to 
change her trust in the County Administrative Board of Västmanland who claimed the opposite. 
We find it obvious that Charlie would trust her own observation rather than what the public 
organization tells her, and consequently we argue that the trust for said organization declined. 
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5.3 The Local Element 
As Wessling (2013) notes, individuals are more likely to comply with instructions personally 
relevant to them. Hence, we argue it is important for public organizations to connect with the 
public, and one possible way of doing so could be to provide local information. Taylor in 
particular stressed the importance of local information during the wildfire. We claim this might 
have been because of her extreme situation, and therefore she had a greater need for urgent 
information. As previously mentioned, she was responsible for a large amount of animals 
which required significant planning and time to evacuate, and additionally she lived right in 
the expected path of the wildfire. 
 
“What was important, was to get local information from the ones closest [to the fire], 
because that’s what was missing […] Since no one came and told us it was dangerous, no 
warnings, no nothing, we had to look for it ourselves, and above all [we did that] locally.”  
- Taylor 
 
Taylor felt there was a lack of local information, as well as of prior notice of the evacuation. 
Here we see a connection to Renn and Levine’s (1991) faith component of trust. As previously 
mentioned (see p. 26), Taylor felt abandoned by the public organizations, and therefore she did 
not believe the organizations had her best interest and well-being at heart. Also Drew 
recognized this shortage of local information, although she did not use the word local. Instead 
she observed the fact that it was the public themselves who reported on the event, and neither 
the public organizations nor the media. 
 
“Because it happened so quickly, it was more or less the public who reported ‘the fire is here 
now’. So that was almost never on the radio or on the TV. […] Instead there was just more of 
a general overview.” - Drew 
 
According to Coombs (2014) the public often feels a great need for information in the 
beginning of a crisis. At the same time, information often is scarce. During the wildfire, we 
claim this might have been due to the speed with which the fire was moving. In other words, 
one could even say the fire spread more quickly than the information did. However, due to the 
characteristics of Facebook, we argue the platform has the possibility to facilitate fast and local 
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information needed to solve this problem. As Taylor mentioned, Facebook was one of her main 
sources of information during, what for her was, the most critical time of the fire: 
 
“I think [the information I got] came from people who called me, and then it was Facebook. 
Yeah, Facebook played a pretty large part at the time. […]  There were the people who 
wanted to come and help, and then there were people who said where it was burning, but a 
lot of that was wrong.” - Taylor 
 
On the other hand, Taylor also mentioned she received a lot of misinformation from individuals 
on Facebook, and we argue this could be one of the disadvantages of Facebook as a crisis 
communication tool. We claim that the less strict gatekeeping on social media could be one of 
the reasons why misinformation is spread, however the minimal control of what is published 
is also why information could be spread quickly on Facebook. Another reason behind 
misinformation might be the many voices on social media (Coombs, 2014) which could cause 
rumors to spread if an organization does not give the public the information it needs (Fors-
Andrée, 2012). The lack of local information during the wildfire caused the individuals in the 
affected area to share what little information they had. Due to the critical nature of the situation 
they might not always have had time to validate it before publishing.  
 
Moreover, other interviewees mentioned the value of local information, even though they 
received it from the local radio station:  
 
“Well, I listened to the radio. [It was] the local broadcasts I turned to.” - Francis 
 
“[…] but it was the local radio station that was on all the time, during the time of the 
reporting I mean.” - Jamie 
 
One reason why our interviewees turned to local media for crisis information might have been 
because, as Fischer (2000) points out, local media has more practical information and tend to 
provide more useful news for the affected individuals in the crisis area. In comparison, national 
media is more inclined to report more general and dramatized information, which even could 
increase the emotional stress among the affected ones (Fischer, 2000). We argue this 
sensationalization clashes with Coombs’ (2014) second base response. However, we see an 
opportunity for the public organizations to decrease this emotional stress, by providing even 
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more local and practical information on Facebook. Also Taylor mentioned this possibility of 
sharing local information, when discussing what kind of information she wanted during the 
wildfire. Besides the fire range, and if she was in any immediate danger, Taylor also gave a 
more concrete example of information she would have wanted to receive: 
 
“[I wanted] very local, very local [information] since it is possible with Facebook. […] 
When we came to the railroad crossing, over here, the level-crossings were down, so if we 
had followed the law we wouldn’t have gotten through. But we did, wriggled us through with 
animal transports and everything, so that was quite lawless I’d say. […] It was the same 
thing there, perhaps you should have just known ‘the level-crossings are down but it is 
alright to cross anyway’ but there were no local information like that. But how it should be 
adjusted, I don’t know.” - Taylor 
 
Despite the possibilities of sharing local information on social media, there could also be 
disadvantages. We argue that local information could require extensive cooperation within, and 
resources from the public organizations, in order to gather, process and validate all of the local 
information. Moreover, the respondents closest to the fire needed information whether or not 
to evacuate, while respondents further away from the fire wanted to know how to manage the 
extensive amounts of smoke blown in their direction. In both cases, the information needed 
could be considered local. With the social constructionist perspective (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 
2008) in mind, what is local could vary from individual to individual. If one is severely affected 
by the fire, local is considered to be the very close by area, while if one is not in an immediate 
danger, but still in the affected area, locally might include a larger area. Furthermore, the 
information needs to be presented in a perspicuous way (Andersson, 2014), which we argue is 
easier in theory than in practice. One possible alternative for a public organization to be 
perceived as more locally relevant would be to create Facebook pages for smaller geographical 
areas. For example, in the case of the wildfire, each municipality could have communicated 
more extensively with their own local target audience.  
 
On the other hand, when several different organizations communicate similar messages during 
the same time span, we claim it could increase the difficulty to speak with what Coombs (2014) 
refers to as one voice. This is problematic because consistent messages are more believable 
(Coombs, 2014). For example, if a county administrative board decides that two municipalities 
should prepare to evacuate and asks them to communicate this to their separate target 
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audiences, there is a chance they might communicate two different messages: Municipality A 
communicates “we will probably evacuate, be prepared”, while Municipality B communicates 
“we will probably not evacuate, but be prepared anyway”. We argue this could create confusion 
and distress among the public, and make them unsure which message to believe. Therefore, 
when accidentally communicating conflicting messages from similar public organizations on 
the same topic, we argue it could decrease their trustworthiness. In our findings the public 
already had a need to validate information as previously discussed (see p. 33), and we argue, if 
they additionally would have received conflicting messages from different public 
organizations, the need to validate would have been even greater.  
 
As previously discussed (see section 5.2.) the public can provide crisis information during a 
disaster (Coombs & Holladay, 2014), which Drew also described earlier (see p. 37). When trust 
is established between the public and an organization, the public can be used as a resource to 
collect local information (Wessling, 2013), as they are usually on-site before the public 
organizations (Wessling, 2013; White, 2012). Another example of this is when Charlie (see p. 
36) explained how the public corrected the public organization’s misinformation about the 
water bombing. The quotation additionally demonstrates the asymmetric relation between the 
public and the public organization (Thomas, 1998), and how local information can be shared 
vertically between them. Furthermore, we mean that local information could also be shared 
horizontally, between members of the public, as Erin describes: 
 
“So I took pictures and wrote a couple of times every day. […] And it was very valuable to 
say the least for those who had houses or summer cabins in the area… And so I wrote it on 
Facebook, and it turned out that people I wasn’t friends with on Facebook had found me on 
Google, and then followed the course of the event [through me].” - Erin 
 
As Erin mentioned she became an unofficial source of information for both individuals who 
lived in the area and for the general public. We argue that public organizations could possibly 
utilize this kind of local information sources. For example, these unofficial sources could be 
encouraged to share information the public organization is publishing on Facebook. They could 
either only forward the information, or screen and rewrite it, which we argue in turn would 
make the information even more local and therefore possibly more personally relevant for the 
affected individuals in their network. As previously argued, individuals are more likely to 
comply with messages that are personally relevant (Wessling, 2013), and therefore we suggest 
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this could be a possible way to improve the crisis communication on Facebook during a 
disaster. As both our elements Local and Personal are so intimately intertwined, this discussion 
will be continued in the next section. 
 
5.4 The Personal Element 
In the findings there were clear opinions on what tone a public organization should use when 
communicating on Facebook during a disaster. Even though there were some differences, a 
personal approach was preferred. One example is Robin who noted: 
 
”I think a personal tone is really important, but it shouldn’t get too private. It has to be 
professional. But still, I think it’s good that it’s clear there’s a person behind the keyboard, 
so it doesn’t get impersonal or a large distance.” - Robin 
 
This respondent asked for a personal tone in the communication, but she also pointed out the 
importance of simultaneously being professional. She further stressed the need for 
communicating with another individual, or at least to have the perception of doing so, instead 
of talking with a faceless organization. This relates to White (2012), who argues that a human 
aspect facilitates for individuals to feel support from the public organization. Further, the public 
is more likely to trust the organization if it is perceived as having the public’s best interest in 
mind (Coombs, 2014; Thomas, 1998), which we argue could be related to communicating in a 
personal tone. Based on this, we argue a personal tone could possibly increase the perception 
of personal relevance, which according to Wessling (2013) could increase compliance for the 
message. Furthermore, a personal tone could improve trust (Reen & Levine, 1991), which in 
turn also could raise compliance (Rød, Botan & Holen, 2012; West & Orr, 2007). Charlie 
emphasized another perspective on tone:  
 
”Well, I actually believe you have to think with your heart. Because, I mean now, when so 
incredibly many people are affected, you have to [stop and] think ’What kind of situation is 
this?’” - Charlie 
 
She argued a public organization should have the recipient’s strenuous situation in mind when 
communicating. She believed compassion is of value in crisis communication. To 
communicate in a sympathetic and sensible way is interconnected with trust (Coombs, 2014), 
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which we argue is one reason for public organizations to have this aspect in mind. The 
empathetic aspect is even more relevant when the public organization is forced to correct its 
own misinformation. One of our respondents mentioned the absence of an apology when the 
public organization had given misinformation:  
 
”You didn’t even get an excuse from them, and I know I was extremely disappointed with that 
[…] I think you could be humble and […] say ’Sorry, that didn’t work out, we apologize’ or 
something like that.” - Taylor 
 
Moreover Alex also discussed the potential of apologizing, and for a public organization to 
correct its own misinformation: 
 
”If you correct it later, and say ’this was wrong, this is how it should have been instead’, that 
I can understand, because you can’t know everything. That’s why it’s so important to select 
the information. Maybe you don’t have to inform about everything.” - Alex 
 
The respondent would understand if the public organization could not always give correct 
information. If a public organization is willing to apologize it might ease the public’s distress, 
which relates to Coombs (2014) second base response. Moreover, Coombs’ (2014) fourth rule 
of how to communicate on social media during a crisis, stresses the importance of adapting the 
tone and practice of the medium used. As Facebook is a social medium where each individual 
creates one’s own individual profile5 we argue that the general use of language and tone is 
personal. As discussed, there are benefits of using a personal tone on Facebook, however there 
are also difficulties that we will explore and discuss later on (see p. 43). Moreover, Coombs’ 
(2014) fourth rule further includes being polite and professional, even when strong language is 
used by the public. This is also addressed by one of our interviewees: 
 
“It felt like those who answered [the questions on Facebook] actually understood how 
hysterical it was for us, that we had our reasons. Some questions were written very 
impolitely, and then they replied very calmly and friendly to the actual question, without 
noticing that aggressive tone. Because if you start reacting towards that tone... [Pause] but 
they really took it down to a reasonable level.” - Erin 
                                                          
5 Facebook, n.d http://newsroom.fb.com/products/ Retrieved 05-25-2015 
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She complemented the public organization for showing sympathy and understanding the 
distress and agitation created by the situation. She further touched upon a problem that can 
arise if the organization allows itself to be provoked by the aggressive approach from the 
public. As Eriksson (2014b) mentions, it is easy to get caught up in any of the different tones 
used by the public in social media, but underlines the importance of adapting to the tone of the 
organization one represents. For example, we argue that if an upset member of the public, who 
uses an angry tone in her message, gets an equally angry reply from the public organization, 
the communication could easily escalate. Moreover, based on the objectivity component of trust 
(Renn & Levine, 1991) we suggest this type of emotionally colored communication could 
decrease the public’s trust in the public organization, while in contrast a more neutral 
communication could increase it. As previously mentioned (see p. 34), what is once published 
online in relation to a public organization, is easily found again and therefore these types of 
conversations might not only affect the trust of the individuals involved, but also the trust of 
others in the future. 
 
As previously demonstrated, we notice a variation of preferences on what tone a public 
organization should use when communicating during a crisis, in our empirical material. For 
example, the respondents mentioned words such as professional, empathetic as well as 
personal, and we argue that finding a balance between these tones could be difficult. Once 
again, our social constructionist perspective (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2008) makes this an even 
more complex matter. On the one hand, there is a risk of being perceived as too private instead 
of personal, and on the other, too impersonal instead of professional. Furthermore, the 
difference between a personal and a professional tone might be perceived as great by one 
recipient, but nonexistent by another. According to Andersson (2014), a too formal tone could 
make the perceived distance between the organization and public larger, while a personal tone 
is more inviting. Yet another example of what tone to use, was mentioned by one by our 
respondents: 
 
 “[…] That you try to be just like health care and rescue... [Pause] well that you try to have a 
calm approach and tone as not to frighten the people who receive the information, but still 
not hiding the truth. That you try to have that calming tone, and act professional. I don’t 
want ’Oh my God, run!’ or something like that but more ’Now, let’s do this, think of that’. 
Clarity.” - Robin 
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She suggests that by mimicking the tone nurses and other emergency staff use in crisis 
situations, one could instill calmness without concealing the severity of the situation. In other 
words, one should tell the truth, but in a composed manner. We argue that this could possibly 
serve as a benchmark for the employees of public organizations when communicating, as a 
“nurse metaphor” might be easier to relate to than just the recommendation of “professional 
and personal, but not private”.  
 
We saw a distinct, and to us slightly surprising way of communicating in our findings. It was 
the private Facebook page of Åsa Eriksson, the Municipal Commissioner of Norberg, which 
was considered a vital source of information: 
 
”So then it was Åsa’s Facebook page that became the most important [source]. Not the 
papers. Not the County Administrative Board. It was her... [Pause] That’s what you trusted. 
And she was local. You knew she was local and you knew she would never write anything that 
wasn’t true. ” - Taylor 
 
Taylor even said that she became the most significant source of information for her during the 
fire, and the respondent felt confident Åsa would not publish incorrect information. We suggest 
this to be partly because she lived in the same area as the interviewee, and therefore was equally 
affected by the fire. Additionally respondents mentioned other qualities which made Åsa 
trustworthy:  
 
”Well, it felt like [Åsa] got to make a lot of decisions in relation to the fire, and it was she, 
together with the incident commander and others, if we say so, who made the decision about 
evacuation and stuff like that.” - Drew 
 
“Well, Åsa is a person I trust. Because she’s professional and good. I thought it was great to 
follow her [on Facebook]. And besides, she had connections right into this center of leaders 
in Ramnäs where they were, so she got information straight from there, and that was really 
good. She is an amazing asset. No matter where you stand politically, she is competent and 
professional in her work.”  - Francis 
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Drew highlighted Åsa’s involvement in the decision making during the wildfire and Francis 
pointed to her professionalism and connections to the individuals in charge. Åsa was perceived 
as trustworthy due to her local connection, established personal network, professional attitude 
and unique access to information from within the crisis management team. At the same time, 
she was a person, and a face to trust in a time of great uncertainty. Another reason people 
trusted her, was because of her earlier presence on Facebook, which according to Coombs 
(2014) makes the communication more trustworthy. 
 
We argue, this relates to some of Renn and Levine’s (1991) components of trust, the first of 
which was perceived competence. Åsa was perceived as being competent because of her role 
as a Municipal Commissioner, and therefore possessed formal status and power as a decision-
maker in the community. Additionally, she was also a member of the crisis management team 
in her municipality, which gave her yet more authority during the event. The second component 
we see a similarity to is what Renn and Levine’s (1991) refer to as sincerity. Åsa was perceived 
as sharing the information she received from the crisis management team openly. This way, 
she was not believed to have a hidden agenda. Furthermore, she was perceived as having the 
public’s best interest in mind, which is another component of trust, which Renn and Levine 
(1991) title faith. Also Coombs (2014) and Thomas (1998) stress this as an important aspect 
when building trust. Moreover, Renn and Levine’s (1991) model consists of six components, 
and since we are limited by our empirical material we do not know how Åsa was perceived in 
relation to objectivity, consistency or fairness. Nevertheless, these components work in 
correlation with each other, and the lack of one could be compensated by excess in another. In 
her case, she was considered trustworthy among the respondents. Therefore she most likely 
either possessed all of the components above, or the three components that we know of 
compensated for the lack of one or several of the others. 
 
Additionally, we argue these aspects of trust might be the reason why the respondents did not 
have a great need to validate Åsa’s information on Facebook, in comparison to information 
provided by public organizations, as previously mentioned (see section 5.3). As Taylor pointed 
out she was certain the information from Åsa was correct, and therefore validation was not 
important to her: 
 
“As I said before, you have to read Facebook [in a certain way]. You kind of have to think 
about where the information comes from [and ask yourself] ‘Is this true?’ Sometimes there 
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were information you had to verify, but I never had to do that with Åsa. There I knew it was 
the truth.” - Taylor 
 
Although Åsa’s presence during the wildfire could be seen as a happy coincidence, we argue 
this is not a unique phenomenon. We claim to have seen this at least once before in Sweden, 
when Lottie Knutson became the face to trust during the 2004 tsunami disaster. The situations 
were very different from each other. For example, Lottie Knutson was the Director of 
Communication for a private corporation (Falkheimer et al., 2009; Strömbäck & Nord, 2006), 
it was an international disaster, and Facebook was not yet a crisis communication tool. Despite 
this, we claim there were also similarities, for example both of the disasters affected Sweden 
and there was a great need for information.  
 
As mentioned earlier, Coombs (2014) notes that in the beginning of a crisis the information is 
often scarce, but at the same time, the need for information is great. In this situation, researchers 
suggest an organization should inform that only limited information is available (Fors-Andrée, 
2012). When Lottie Knutson broke the initial silence from the authorities during the tsunami 
disaster (Strömbäck & Nord, 2006), we argue she met the need for information for the Swedish 
public. We mean something similar occurred in Västmanland, only smaller in scale, when Åsa 
started sharing information during a period of perceived information dearth. Based on Renn 
and Levine’s (1991) components of trust, we argue both women became trusted individuals 
due to their professionalism, access to and willingness to share information, as well as their 
personal approach. 
 
Moreover, even when the initial need for urgent information during the wildfire had subsided, 
we argue that Åsa had already established herself as an important figure for the affected 
individuals. Therefore the respondents continued to use her as a trusted information source 
throughout the crisis, as one of our interviewees exemplifies: 
 
“I felt like... She never posted any other information than what usually was posted on the 
Municipal of Norberg’s webpage. It wasn’t like any inside information or anything, but still I 
felt like you got a more direct [information flow] that way. So I thought that was valuable.” 
 - Drew 
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Even though Drew later on could get the same information from the municipality, she chose to 
keep following Åsa on Facebook. We suggest this is another argument for why public 
organizations should use “faces to trust” in disasters. However, we do understand the difficulty 
of finding individuals like Åsa. For example, as previously mentioned, her presence might have 
been coincidental and the next time a disaster strikes, there might not be an obvious individual 
for the public to turn to. Coombs (2014) argues that well informed staff members are more 
likely to forward correct information, and Shklovski et al. (2008) argue that the public is likely 
to turn to local individuals with direct connections to the disaster when there is no other 
information available. Therefore we argue, in case of a disaster, that public organizations 
should keep their employees well informed, to increase the possibility of them forwarding 
correct information through their personal networks on Facebook. Under the right 
circumstances, we argue that the employees of the public organization might voluntarily 
become local information sources. 
 
5.5 Re-intertwining the Elements 
We started this analysis by stating how all of our elements were closely related to trust, and 
intimately intertwined with each other. Therefore, after discussing them relatively separately, 
we would now like to discuss them altogether to further highlight their relations to each other.  
 
Despite the rather concrete nature of our research questions, the findings became very complex 
in its essence. With a starting point in Renn and Levine’s (1991) components of trust, we argue 
that depending on the trustworthiness of the public organization, Facebook as a crisis 
communication tool could be both beneficial and disadvantageous. For example, if the trust in 
a public organization on Facebook is high, the need for frequent updates when there is nothing 
new to report is low. High trust also decreases the need to validate information from said 
organization, and incorrect information might be more easily forgiven. In contrast, when trust 
is low the need for frequent updates is greater, which might be due to the perceived chance for 
the public organization to screen the information, and possibly even purposely withhold 
relevant information. Consequently, the need to validate this information becomes greater, 
which increases the likeliness of using other sources, and possibly excluding the public 
organization completely. This poses a risk because if the direct communication between the 
public organization and the public is disrupted, vital disaster information might not get through 
which could lead to increased distress and possible physical injuries among the public.  
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Rumors are an existing issue on Facebook, and we argue rumors are more easily mistaken for 
facts when the trustworthiness of a public organization is questioned. Based on Coombs’ 
(2014) aspects on how to communicate during a crisis, another possible reason for the public 
to trust rumors could be a lack of confirmed information from public organizations. For 
example, if a public organization does not communicate quickly enough, especially in the 
beginning of a crisis, individuals might start sharing what little information they have on 
Facebook. This could be exemplified by local residents who believe they have seen the fire in 
an area, share these experiences on Facebook as a fact, and unintentionally start rumors.  
 
On the other hand, if mutual trust is established, the public organization and the local residents 
might have a meaningful exchange of information (Thomas, 1998). For example, local 
residents could share useful information with the public organization, and the public 
organization could aid the public by correcting facts before a rumor is widely spread. However, 
even if there is no mutual trust we argue that the public might communicate with a public 
organization to correct severe misinformation, which is facilitated by the two-way nature of 
Facebook. Consequently, both rumors and misinformation could create distress among the 
public, and it might also cause decisions to be made on false pretenses.  
 
In our findings, local information from public organizations on Facebook is not only highly 
valued, but it also affects the public’s trust. A larger degree of local information increases trust, 
while a smaller degree decreases it, which relates to how local media is argued to be more 
credible among the local public because of its relevance and accuracy (Cohen et al., 2007). 
Moreover, the trust for a public organization could also be affected by the tone used when 
communicating on Facebook. In our material a personal tone was appreciated and affected trust 
positively, which might be due to the perception of talking to a human being, instead of a 
faceless organization. There is also an indication that a personal tone might increase the degree 
of forgiveness the public has towards a public organization that unintentionally communicates 
misinformation. 
 
As mentioned above, local information and a personal tone increases trust for a public 
organization, and we argue a high degree of trust consequently decreases the need for 
validation. This might be why “a face to trust” was greatly appreciated during the wildfire; it 
is simply easier to trust a familiar face than an abstract organization. One example is how an 
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individual in an official position, with direct access to accurate information about the disaster, 
could use one’s own personal network on Facebook to communicate to the public, either 
officially or unofficially. A second example we see indications of is also how a private 
individual could become an unofficial source of information for the public, which possibly 
could be used by a public organization as a secondary information channel if these individuals 
are kept well informed. This is in line with Renn and Levine (1991) who state that the right 
context can enable individuals to act as trustworthy communicators, a context we argue is 
created on Facebook. 
 
However, we do acknowledge that satisfying the multiple needs of the public is demanding, 
and to answer all questions on social media is not only expected (Coombs, 2014), but for a 
public organization also required by Swedish law (see Appendix 4).  This, in combination with 
collecting and validating an extensive amount of local information, requires extensive 
resources. Realistically, we see a limit to the physical and monetary means of a public 
organization, and therefore all of the public’s needs might not be met.  
 
Finally, we are aware that other aspects affect the crisis communication during a disaster as 
well. For example, an organization cannot control how the message is received. This is because 
the recipient always exists in a context, where matters such as language barriers, disabilities or 
temporary distractions might all affect how well the message is understood. Moreover, the 
social constructionist perspective (Alvesson & Sköldberg, 2008) further complicates the 
elements of crisis communication. We argue that quick, correct, local and personal are all 
relative terms holding different meanings for different individuals, and this complexity might 
make it more difficult for a public organization to successfully communicate during a disaster. 
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6 Conclusion 
The purpose of this thesis is to explore how social media could be used by a public 
organization to communicate in a disaster, from a recipient perspective. In this section, our 
two research questions are answered based on our findings in theories and empirical 
material.  
 
6.1 What information did the public perceive as 
important on Facebook during the disaster? 
Firstly, correct information is highly valued. Even if it might be considered obvious, incorrect 
information from public organizations during a disaster does exist, and it greatly affects the 
public’s trust for the organizations. It could also negatively affect the public both physically as 
well as psychologically. In previous management focused research, the benefits of sharing 
information quickly have been found to outweigh the risks of publishing incorrect information 
(Coombs, 2014). However, from our recipient perspective we have not found support for this 
theory. Instead correct information was demanded, and only occasionally overlooked, 
depending on the severity of the incorrectness, and the trustworthiness of the organization prior 
to the incident.   
 
Secondly, the need for local information is great. It is considered personally relevant since it 
clarifies more precisely what actions to take and what is currently happening in the closest area, 
which consequently reduces anxiety among the public. Contrary, in the absence of local 
information a perceived lack of information can emerge, which sequently might cause rumors 
to spread when individuals share what little they know. During a disaster, local information 
could even contribute to minimizing the number of lives lost and properties damaged. 
 
6.2 How did the public prefer this information to be 
communicated on Facebook during the disaster? 
Firstly, there is a demand for receiving information quickly, and even a need for immediate and 
frequent updates. Quick information could prevent rumors from spreading, and enhance the 
public’s perception of the organization communicating in an open and honest manner. In turn, 
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this could improve the trust for the public organizations, which might make the public more 
inclined to comply with instructions, and consequently keep the public safer in times of 
disaster. On the other hand, quick and frequent updates create inconveniently large volumes of 
information. However, the information overload is excused with the explanation that what is 
not relevant for one individual, might be relevant for another. 
 
Secondly, personal crisis communication increases the impact of the message, because having 
a face to trust, rather than speaking to an abstract organization, is preferred by the public. This 
could be achieved in several ways: for example by simply using a personal tone when creating 
messages on Facebook, or by encouraging employees to share correct information in their 
personal networks. In turn, this could lead to an employee becoming a local and personal source 
of information. 
 
Finally, by accommodating these elements the public’s trust for the public organization should 
increase. Consequently, it would reduce the risk of rumors, decrease the public’s need for 
validation in urgent situations, and lessen the distress among the public during the disaster.  
52 
 
7 Possible Further Research 
When pursuing our research, we found several interesting aspects which could inspire further 
research. Since our thesis has a qualitative approach, we cannot make any generalizations about 
our findings. Therefore we encourage further exploration of this field to assess whether our 
discoveries are coincidental, or if they are part of a larger pattern. 
 
One interesting aspect was the personal approach on crisis communication exemplified by the 
Municipal Commissioner of Norberg, Åsa Eriksson. We also saw a possibility of using the 
preexisting networks and trustworthiness of private individuals when communicating during a 
disaster. With this in mind, it would be interesting to determine whether or not other individuals 
in similar situations also would have valued this personal connection. If so, it would be of 
interest to evaluate how a crisis communication plan comprising our four elements quick, 
correct, local and personal affect the public’s trust for a public organization.  
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8 Final Words 
Communication during a disaster is vital, and well performed crisis communication in social 
media can save lives. We have aspired to contribute with useful information to this research 
field, as well as to encourage others to further investigate this very important and complex 
matter. 
 
Communicating during a disaster is also very difficult. This is because what is perceived as 
efficient communication lies in the eye of the beholder. For this very reason there is always 
potential for improvement, which makes the field of Crisis Communication ever changing and 
continuously challenging. As one of our interviewees so excellently explained it: 
 
“The day you think you’ll experience a crisis where no one complains about the information, 
that day will never come.” - Alex 
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Appendices    
Appendix 1: Facebook 
Facebook is a large social network that was launched in February 2004 in USA. The platform 
has grown quickly the last couple of years, and in March 2015 it had 936 million users who 
were active on a daily basis6. The company was introduced to the NASDAQ stock exchange 
in 20127, and is therefore dependable on its profit. Facebook is widely used in Sweden, 
however there are still individuals who do not visit the site. For example, the main part of 
people aged 55 years or older never uses the site, and during the most recent years the use of 
the platform among teenagers in the age 12 to 15 years has declined (Findahl, 2014). 
  
                                                          
6 Facebook, n.d http://newsroom.fb.com/company-info/ Retrieved 05-25-2015 
7 Facebook, 2012 http://newsroom.fb.com/news/2012/05/facebook-announces-pricing-of-initial-public-
offering/ Retrieved 05-25-2015 
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Appendix 2: Interview guide 
 Could you please tell us a little about yourself? 
 Would you mind telling us how you use Facebook an average day?  
 Could you describe how you used Facebook during the wildfire? 
 How did you experience the communication on Facebook during the wildfire? 
 If an event like this would happen again, what kind of information do you think you 
would like to receive on Facebook? 
 Could you explain how you would like to receive this information on Facebook? 
 Is there anything else you would like to tell us? 
 
  
62 
 
Appendix 3: Timeline based on our limitations 
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Appendix 4: The Principle of Public Access 
In Sweden the public sector is mainly made up by the public administration, the ministries, 
the county councils or regions, and the municipality8. Within these one finds public 
organizations such as county council administrative boards9, police10 and emergency 
services11. Moreover, theses public organizations abide to the principle of public access to 
information, which could be described as a requirement of openness. It entitles the public, as 
well as the media, insight into the activities of the organizations. Anyone is allowed to read 
the official documents, and the employees are free to disclose what they know to a third party 
as well as and under normal circumstances they have the right to give information to the 
media12. Lastly, when this principle is placed upon public organizations in social media, it 
has been juridically proven the organization is obligated to answer comments and questions 
as soon as possible13.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 Nationalencyklopedin, 2015 http://www.ne.se.ludwig.lub.lu.se/uppslagsverk/encyklopedi/lång/förvaltning 
Retrieved 2015-25-05 
9 Länsstyrelsen, 2015 http://www.lansstyrelsen.se/jonkoping/Sv/om-
lansstyrelsen/pressrum/Pages/fakta_om_lansstyrelsen.aspx Retrieved 2015-25-05 
10 Regeringen, 2015 http://www.regeringen.se/sb/d/2462 Retrieved 2015-25-05 
11 Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting, 2015 
http://skl.se/tjanster/lattlast/vadarsverigeskommunerochlandstingskl.593.html Retrieved 2015-25-05 
12 Regeringskansliet, 2013 http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/20/80/71/f108795f.pdf  
Retrieved 2015-25-05 
13 Sveriges Kommuner och Landsting, 2015 
http://skl.se/download/18.547ffc53146c75fdec0ef1b6/1405429253387/skl-juridisktpm-socialamedier.pdf 
Retrieved 2015-25-05 
 
